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Germany Brings Home the War on
Organized Crime
BY JAMES J. KILLEAN, ESQ.*
I. Introduction
The "Lauschangriff" is a legislative effort to allow German
police to monitor homes by means of electronic surveillance. Efforts
to enact the Lauschangriff legislation began over eight years ago,
when organized crime groups from the former Soviet Bloc countries
began to infiltrate Germany at an alarming rate. Police efforts to
crack the inner circles of these highly sophisticated crime groups were
hindered because the Grundgesetz, Germany's constitution,
prohibited the use of electronic surveillance to gather evidence from
private homes.
The Lauschangriff legislation was specifically designed to alter
this supposed shortcoming in the Grundgesetz. However, its proposal
generated seven years of fierce debate. Proponents of the legislation
argued that the Lauschangriff provided police and prosecutors with
"equal weapons" to fight this new breed of criminal. Opponents
contended that the Lauschangriff was a gross violation of civil
liberties and signaled the end of the "rule of law" in Germany They
* J.D., Vanderbilt Law School; M.A., Syracuse University. I would like to
thank Professor Craig Smith of Vanderbilt Law School and Dr. Dieter Umbach,
Professor of Law at the University of Potsdam, for their helpful comments,
suggestions and guidance. I would also like to thank Drs. Dennis McCort, Gerlinde
Sanford and Gerd Schneider of Syracuse University for always making the study of
German culture interesting.
1. "The Eavesdropping Attack" (author's translation). Although proponents of
the Lauschangriff criticize this nickname as having argumentative overtones, the
label has become popular for the legislation. See Erhard Denninger, Lauschangriff-
Anmerkungen eines Verfassungsrechtlers, STV, July, 1998, at 401.
2. See Bundestag Approves Constitutional Revision to Allow Electronic
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warned that the Lauschangriff would destroy the sanctity of the home
and engender fear among the populace of yet another oppressive
government The opinions concerning the Lauschangriff were so
strong that Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger resigned from her
position as Federal Minister of Justice after her own party voted to
support the legislation.4  The legislature finally enacted the
Lauschangriff on February 8, 1998. However, seven years of debate
and compromise diluted certain aspects of the Lauschangriff, and the
Federal Constitutional Court5 (FCC) has yet to rule on its
constitutionality.
The purpose of this article is to examine the general controversy
surrounding the Lauschangriff and propose ways of improving the
result reached by Germany's parliament. Part II of this article will
examine the causes and effects of organized crime in Germany. Part
III will discuss the system of basic rights in German constitutionalism.
Part IV will illustrate the deficiency in the law prior to the enactment
of the Lauschangriff. Part V will discuss the various constitutional
issues surrounding the Lauschangriff. Part VI will briefly examine
potential obstacles to the effectiveness of the Lauschangriff. Finally,
part VII will suggest ways in which Germany can afford greater
protection to civil liberties such as the right to privacy, while at the
same time effectively fighting organized crime.
H. Germany's Organized Crime Problem
A. The Globalization of Organized Crime
Over the past decade organized crime has swept across Europe
at an unprecedented rate.6 There are several factors contributing to
Surveillance, WEEK IN GERMANY, Jan. 23, 1998.
3. Opponents to the Lauschangriff warn that it represents a revival of the
police-state tactics of the Nazi regime and the former German Democratic Republic.
See Germany Reduces Privacy Rights, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8,1998, at A8.
4. See Bonn Plans Tougher Laws Against Organised Crime, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, June 19, 1996.
5. The Federal Constitutional Court is the supreme guardian of the
Grundgesetz. It decides all constitutional issues arising under the Grundgesetz in
much the same way that the U.S. Supreme Court has the final say on American
constitutional issues. See Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A
Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 840-45 (1991).
6. For a more detailed discussion of the problems posed by international
organized crime in Europe, see generally Joel S. Solomon, Forming a More Secure
Union: The Growing Problem of Organized Crime in Europe as a Challenge to
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the recent proliferation of international crime. First, organized crime,
like any other business, seeks out market opportunities.7 Just "as
global markets have developed in the supply of legitimate goods,
parallel developments have occurred in crime."8 Organized criminals
generate profits by satisfying demands for contraband in areas where
such items are not otherwise available.9 Thus, organized crime will
expand in any direction where there is a market for its goods or
services.
Second, just as modern technology has created a "global village"
for legitimate businesses, it has also enabled organized crime groups
to execute their illegal activities on an international scale. Modern
communications and encryption technology allows domestic criminals
to conspire with foreign criminals with little possibility of detection.
Computers enable criminals to perpetrate crimes in foreign countries
without ever leaving their desks.1 Modern banking technology allows
hundreds of billions of dollars to shift hands each day, making it
nearly impossible to detect or track even the largest money-
laundering transactions." As these trends suggest, organized crime
National Sovereignty, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 623 (1995).
7. See Tom Sherman, The Internationalisation of Crime and the World
Community's Response, 19 CoMMw. L. BuLL. 1814,1815 (1993).
8. See id. at 1814.
9. See id. One commentator has noted that "[t]he planning, coordination and
commission of the offenses [of organized crime] follow strict economic criteria....
Before new lines of business are developed, professional marketing studies are even
commissioned in some cases." Jurgen Meyer, Organized Crime: Recent German
Legislation and the Prospects for a Coordinated European Approach, 3 COLUM. J.
EuR. L. 243,245 (1997).
10. See Michael J. Elliot, et al., Global Mafia: A Newsweek Investigation,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1993, at 22; see also Sherman, supra note 7, at 1816.
Government regulation of encryption technology has produced fierce debates
concerning whether individuals have a First Amendment right to encode their
communications. See generally Jill M. Ryan, Note, Freedom To Speak Unintelligibly:
The First Amendment Implications of Government-Controlled Encryption, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 1165 (1996). (An ancillary question has arisen concerning
whether American companies should be allowed to export such technology, where it
will likely fall into the hands of criminals. See generally Charles L. Evans, Comment,
U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software: Efforts to Protect National Security
Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to Compete in Foreign Markets, 19 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 469 (1994); Bernadette Barnard, Note, Leveraging
Worldwide Encryption Standards Via U.S. Export Controls: The U.S. Government's
Authority to "Safeguard" the Global Information Infrastructure, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 429 (1997).)
11. See Sherman, supra note 7, at 1816.
12. See id.
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groups utilize the most advanced technology available to further their
interests.
Third, the collapse of communism has created an environment
conducive to criminal activity." Under communist rule, the Soviet
Union was a well-organized system of bribes, theft and corruption."
Because the corruption was orchestrated by the government, those
who did not adhere to the informal rules of corruption could be
openly punished." But once the communist regime collapsed, there
was no institution capable of exerting control over the various crime
groups, which were now able to freely compete among themselves
over disputed territory.16 Furthermore, after the Soviet system of
government had been abandoned, members of the government sold
government-operated businesses to themselves at nominal prices.
Anything left over was sold on the black market or directly to
organized crime groups.'7 This rapid privatization of state assets
enabled crime groups to acquire vast amounts of Russia's natural
resources." As a result, organized crime is estimated to control as
much as 80% of the Russian economy." One columnist has noted
that "[i]t is impossible to differentiate between Russian organized
crime and the Russian state."20
Finally, international developments of this past decade have
given organized crime groups greater mobility than ever before. The
collapse of the Soviet Union allowed criminal groups to export their
criminal activities virtually unfettered by border regulation. Today,
13. See generally Sara Jankiewicz, Comment, Glasnost and the Growth of Global
Organized Crime, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 215 (1995).
14. See generally Clifford Gaddy, et al., Mafiosi and Matrioshki: Organized Crime
and Russian Reform, 13 BROOKINGS REv. 26 (1995).
15. See id.
16. See id. Some commentators hypothesize that organized crime was necessary
for the survival of the collapsing Russian economy. See, e.g., id. Without a stable
government to enforce contracts, parties could refuse to perform their obligations
without fear of legal liability. Thus, the "protection" accorded the victims of
organized crime "give[s] business people the confidence to enter into contracts that
would otherwise be too risky." Id.
17. See Joseph M. Jones, Russia's Trial by Fire, 10 CRIM. JUST. 12 (1995).
18. See Claire Sterling, Redfellas, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 14, 1994, at 19-20.
Although Russia's economy was in shambles, it was still the world's most abundant
source of natural resources. See id.
19. See CLAIRE STERLING, THIEVES' WORLD: THE THREAT OF THE NEW GLOBAL
NETWORK OF ORGANIZED CRIME 99 (1994).
20. Arnaud de Borchgrave, Transnational Crime Casts Huge Shadow Over the
Globe, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at A14.
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there is "no trace left of the 'Iron Curtain,' which sealed off eastern
Europe for 40 years."'" Furthermore, the European Union has been
unable to stop the flow of organized crime across European borders.'
The diminishing significance of national borders within the European
Union allows criminals to enter undetected.2
The result of these events has been a swell of organized criminal
activity across western Europe. However, as will be discussed below,
no western European country has been more affected by this
internationalization of organized crime than Germany.
B. The Presence of Organized Crime in Germany
As early as 1992, it became clear that Germany was becoming a
main growth center for organized crime."24 Germany's position in the
center of Europe and its close proximity to the former Soviet Union
have made it the prime target of Eastern Bloc organized crime.' For
example, over half of the estimated 140 Russian crime groups
operating internationally are located in Germany.6 Furthermore,
Berlin has become the Russian Mafia's European base of operations,
due to its large population of ex-Soviet citizens.27 According to
21. Manfred Prllcklein, Feature: Battle on the Border as Refugee Trade Earns
More Than Drugs, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Nov. 29, 1998. "All the border
barricades and fencing had disappeared completely by 1990." Id. "'It's wonderful
that the Iron Curtain is gone, but it was a shield for the West. Now we've opened the
gates, and this is very dangerous for the world. America is getting Russian criminals;
Europe is getting Russian criminals. They'll steal everything. They'll occupy
Europe. Nobody will have the resources to stop them. You people in the West don't
know our Mafia yet; you will, you will."' STERLING, supra note 19, at 113 (quoting
Russian Chief Serious Crimes Investigator Boris Uvarov).
22. See Solomon, supra note 6, at 629.
23. See Elliot, supra note 10.
24. See generally Anton Hauck, Combatting Cross-Border Crime: Germany's
Money Laundering Legislation, 7 INT'L L. PRACricuM 88 (1994) (citing
Gewinnabschopfung und Geldwidsche, JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU 353; Dreckiges
Geld, saubere Helfer, DER SPIEGEL, Nos. 9-11 (1992)). According to former German
Interior Minister Manfred Kanther, between 600 and 700 organized crime groups,
with up to 8,000 members, are currently active in Germany. See Bonn Approves
Police Bugging Law, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Feb. 6,1998.
25. See Barbara Demick, Russian Mafia Hits Germany: Members of "The
Organization" Blamed for Violent Crime, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 21,1993, at A28.
26. See Official: Russian Crime Invading Europe and the U.S., WASH. TIMES,
June 5, 1996, at A14 (quoting Vladimir Topyrichev, deputy head of the Russian
Interior Ministry's organized crime department).
27. Over 100,000 ex-Soviet citizens currently live in Berlin. Four main Russian
Mafia groups control Berlin's organized crime activities. Each group "specializes in a
different form of crime, including assassinations, drugs, prostitution and
2000]
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officials in Berlin's state crime office, "Berlin has become a cross-
roads for organised criminality," with most of the criminals coming
from Eastern Europe6
These criminals engage in a wide variety of activities typically
associated with organized crime.2 ' Apart from drug trafficking and
protection money extortion, forced prostitution and immigrant
smuggling have been the fastest growing areas of organized crime.
There have been numerous cases of women and children being
smuggled from Russia, Ukraine and Poland and forced into
prostitution in Germany. Between 1992 and 1995, this trade in
human flesh increased by 300% .30 Also, immigrant smuggling is often
more profitable than drug trafficking." Refugees often agree to pay
upwards of $5,000 to be smuggled into Germany.' To pay for their
passage, these immigrants are forced to work on the black market
once they arrive in Germany.3 Most of these immigrants find their
way to Berlin.' In the first nine months of 1998, over 28,000 illegal
immigrants had been captured crossing the German border.35
Certainly the most serious development in organized criminal
activity in Germany is the smuggling of fissile nuclear material."
kidnappings." Andrew Borowiec, Experts See Russian Mafia's Influence Growing in
Europe, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1998, at A6.
28. Clive Freeman, Rapid Increase in the Amount of Organised Crime in Berlin,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Aug. 3, 1998.
29. Interpol defines organized crime as "[any enterprise or group of persons
engaged in a continuing illegal activity which has as its primary purpose the
generation of profits irrespective of national boundaries." The Interpol FAQ on
organised crime File, (visited Feb. 2, 1999) <http://www.kenpubs.co.uk/interpol-
pr/English/faq/faqcri.htm>. The main activities of criminal associations are
racketeering, fraud, car theft, robbery, armed assault, drug dealing, trafficking in
weapons and radioactive material, trafficking in human beings and exploitation
through prostitution, alien smuggling, smuggling of precious and antique goods,
extortion for protection money, gambling, embezzling from industries and financial
institutions up to infiltration and control of private and commercial banks, and
controlling black markets. See id.
30. See Freeman, supra note 28.
31. See Pracklein, supra note 21.
32. See Smuggling People Across the Border on the Rise, Expert Says, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Oct. 28, 1995.
33. See Freeman, supra note 28.
34. There are between 100,000 and 150,000 illegal immigrants living in Berlin
alone. See id.
35. See Pricklein, supra note 21.
36. For a more detailed discussion on the smuggling of nuclear material, see
generally Jeffrey B. Fugal, Comment, A Brief Survey of the Smuggling of Fissile
Material: An Embryonic Phenomena [sic] with a Terrifying Future in the European
[Vol. 23:173
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Evidence exists that the Russian Mafia has attempted to access
Russia's 33,000 nuclear warheads in order to sell them on the black
market." According to Germany's federal intelligence agency, the
Bundesnachrichtendienst, there were almost 300 attempts to smuggle
nuclear materials into Germany in 1994 alone.' Although most of
these "attempts" either turned out to be hoaxes or did not involve
weapons-grade material, the fact that even one attempt was
legitimate underscores the seriousness of this problem to the security
of the European Union.39
Although the ferocity and brutality of the Russian Mafia40 have
made it a top priority among German authorities, it is important to
note that several other organized crime groups operate in Germany
as well. For example, the Vietnamese "terror syndicates" control
eastern Germany's black market cigarette trade.41 Gang wars over
this lucrative market 2 have resulted in over 100 brutal murders since
1992."3 Also, Romanian terror syndicates use Berlin as their base of
operations. These groups specialize in hit-and-run style robberies on
gas stations and stores in and around Berlin.' Finally, Turkish gangs
continue to dominate the drug trafficking industry."5
Community, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 289 (1995).
37. See David Morelli, Russian Isotopes Recovered: Stolen Non-Radioactive
Elements Seized By Authorities, WINDSOR STAR, Feb. 9,1995, at A4.
38. See Fugal, supra note 36, at 293-94.
39. See id.
40. Police suspected that the Russian Mafia was involved in the murders of six
people in a Frankfurt brothel during the week of August 20, 1994, because the degree
of cruelty and ferocity involved was typical of murders committed by the Russian
Mafia. See Monika Hillemacher, Authorities Fear Russian Mafia Linked to Frankfurt
Brothel Murders, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Aug. 16,1994.
41. Vietnamese Terror Syndicates smuggle cigarettes from Poland, where taxes
on cigarettes are very low, into Germany, where cigarette taxes are very high. See
Andrew McCathie, Germany: Bonn, Hanoi Set Terms for Repatriation, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, July 8, 1996. An estimated 40,000 Vietnamese are living illegally
in Germany. See German Official Satisfied with Pace of Vietnamese Repatriation,
DEUTScHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Dec. 22, 1997.
42. Illegal cigarette smuggling represents a loss of $600 million each year to the
German taxing authorities. See McCathie, supra note 41.
43. See id.
44. See Clive Freeman, Youth Criminality Soars in the German Capital,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 10, 1996.
45. See Organized Crime Drops Slightly in Germany, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, June 8,1998.
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C. The Effects of Organized Crime in Germany
In numerical terms, the swell of organized crime has had a
significant effect on German society. According to the annual crime
report conducted by the German Interior Ministry, almost 43,000
instances of organized crime were reported in 1997.46 Organized
crime caused almost $6 billion in damage between 1992 and 1996.47
However, other estimates place the annual turnover of organized
crime in Germany at between DM50 billion and DM100 billion
(approximately $35 billion to $70 billion at current exchange rates).'
From a philosophical perspective, the harm caused by organized
crime to the institutions of democracy cannot be underestimated.
Members of organized crime groups reap enormous profits from their
illegal activities. These profits are then "laundered," a process by
which money derived from illegal sources is made to appear as if it
stems from legitimate sources. 9 This laundered money is then "used
to expand the wealth of the syndicate."5 The consequence of this
cyclical accumulation of wealth is an extreme concentration of
"power in the hands of criminals, who will then be in a position to
infiltrate and corrupt state and business institutions."'" As one news
article reported, "[t]he prices for bribes are well known."52
Reportedly, DM1,000 will purchase a residency permit, DM10,000
will obtain a driver's license or consent to own a night-club, and
DM100,000 buys speedy approval of major construction projects.' It
is this threat to democracy which caused the Ministry of the Interior
to report that "[o]rganised crime presents a serious threat for
domestic security."54
D. The Problems Facing Law Enforcement Agencies
German authorities have been largely unsuccessful in solving the
46. See id. This number says nothing of unreported cases.
47. See Wolfgang Janisch, Legal Officials Agree on Danger of Organized Crime,
But Little Else, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Sept. 23, 1997 (quoting figures
expressed by former German Interior Minister Manfred Kanther).
48. See Hauck, supra note 24, at 88.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 89.
51. Id.
52. Leon Mangasarian, Corruption Stuns Germans, Who Thought That Only
Happened Elsewhere, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, July 19, 1995.
53. See id.
54. Bonn Approves Police Bugging Law, supra note 24.
[Vol. 23:173
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organized crime problem for two primary reasons. First, criminal
organizations compartmentalize individual agents within the
organization. That is, they meticulously seal off individual members
from each other, thus concealing the identities of the core individuals
even from their own partners in crime." This process of
compartmentalization prevents investigating officers from observing
the internal operation of the criminal organization.56 Furthermore,
"detained individual offenders can often offer little useful
information about their accomplices, let alone about the internal
structures of the organizations.""
This compartmentalization makes application of the "equal
weapons" principle in German criminal prosecutions difficult. As
explained by Professor Meyer, this principle ensures a fair criminal
proceeding by requiring that the state's investigatory apparatus be
balanced against the defenses of the accused." In the context of
individual criminal acts, application of this principle presents no real
obstacles. However, prior to the enactment of the Lauschangriff, the
state's investigatory tools proved inadequate to combat the rise in
organized crime because compartmentalization prevents the
investigation and prosecution of core members of the criminal
organizations.59 Authorities cannot crack criminal organizations or
prevent organized crime by investigating and prosecuting individual
criminal acts. To be successful, "[t]he procedures used by the
investigatory authorities must be adapted to take account of the new
criminal logistics if they are to have any real chance of adequately
addressing organized crime. '  The recently enacted Lauschangriff
legislation is intended to provide investigators with equal weapons in
the face of modem criminal sophistication.
The second major obstacle preventing investigation and
prosecution of criminal organizations is the phenomenon of
hybridization. A troubling characteristic of organized crime is that it
"cannot be precisely defined, therefore making it difficult to
demarcate it clearly from the world of legitimate business.",
61






61. Id. at 243. According to Professor Meyer, the methods used by organized
crime groups "have become highly intricate and economically sophisticated. Legal
2000]
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"'Today's organized crime bosses operate from conventional-
appearing companies while mixing their legal and illegal activities
within the framework of perfectly normal business life."'62 Because of
this hybrid nature of modern criminal activities, crime groups are able
to render themselves "invisible through blending in."'  To combat
organized crime, it will be necessary for investigators to distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate business activities. The first step in this
direction is to identify those individuals affiliated with organized
crime groups, a task the Lauschangriff is designed to accomplish.
HI. Germany's Constitutional Framework
To understand the controversy surrounding the Lauschangriff
legislation, one must first understand certain basic principles of
German constitutionalism. This section of the article begins with a
brief discussion of the value system embodied in the Grundgesetz,
Germany's constitution. It then explains the general theory behind
basic rights within the constitutional system. Finally, it identifies
limitations imposed on the government with regard to state action
intruding upon those basic rights.
A. The Rechtsstaat and the Objective Order of Values
In the aftermath of World War II, Germany was faced with the
formidable task of creating a "better" constitution than that of the
Weimar Republic. A better constitution was required because
although the Weimar Constitution recognized the existence of human
rights, it completely failed to give those rights any practical meaning.'
Weimar's greatest failure was in establishing the norm that the state
was governed by the formal rule of law (Rechtsstaat).6' This
governing norm ultimately led to human rights abuses because "law,"
and illegal acts form a skein that is difficult to disentangle." Id. at 244.
62. See Janisch, supra note 47 (quoting Professor Hans-Joerg Albrecht, Director
of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law in Freiburg,
Germany.)
63. Id.
64. See HERMANN V. MANGOLDT ET AL., DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETZ 79 (Verlag
Franz Vahlen 1985). See also DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 33 (1997) (noting that
"the Weimar Constitution recognized basic rights as goals, but they were not
judicially enforceable").
65. In the Anglo-American tradition, "rule of law" generally means that public
officials are bound by law. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 18 (1994).
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under this formal Rechtsstaat, meant mere positive law.66 Thus, those
who made the laws could change the laws to fit their needs.
Democracy itself became the tool of fascism.' The Weimar
Constitution's second failure was in making its bill of rights subject to
limitation by ordinary legislation. Once the Nazis assumed control of
the Reichstag, Germany's parliament, they were able to render those
rights meaningless by "democratic" means.' Finally, because the
Weimar Constitution failed to give citizens any means of enforcing
those rights (e.g., judicial redress), any human rights abuses at the
hands of the Nazis were uncontestable.69
The Grundgesetz protects against such abuses of the system by
modifying the formal Rechtsstaat into a "substantive charter of
justice."'7  Although this modem Rechtsstaat establishes the
supremacy of the constitution7' and gives the Basic Rights binding
force of law,' the Rechtsstaat is no longer bound by the mere positive
language of the Grundgesetz's text. Instead, it is bound to a "supra-
66. See Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Der "grote Lauschangriff':
Sicherheit Statt Freiheit, ZRP 1998, HEFr 3, at 89.
67. Josef Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, explained how the Nazis
would use democracy as a weapon against the republic almost five years before the
Nazis assumed power: "We [the Nazis] will enter the Reichstag to equip ourselves
with weapons from democracy's own arsenal. We will become delegates in order to
cripple the Weimar way of thinking with tools of its own devise." Josef Goebbels, in
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, supra note 66, at 89 (author's translation).
68. See Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, supra note 66, at 89. The Nazis used law
as a means of empowering themselves by negating any legal obstacles that stood in
their way. In 1933, the Nazis extinguished the separation of powers, nullified the
most important basic rights, and suspended the principle that all laws must conform
to the constitution. See id.
69. See v. MANGOLDT, supra note 64, at 79.
70. KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 37. The modem Rechtsstaat principle imposes
extensive requirements and limitations upon the state. Some such requirements
include fair warning, fair procedure, limitations on retroactivity, and limitations on
delegation of policymaking authority. See CURRIE, supra note 65, at 19. It also
includes "substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights." Id.
Note that this expansion of the Rechtsstaat principle is not the only improvement of
the Grundgesetz over the Weimar Constitution. The Grundgesetz also deviates from
obvious shortcomings of the Weimar Constitution more directly. For example,
article 1, paragraph 3, gives the Basic Rights the force of law. Also, article 19,
paragraph 4, gives each citizen a right to judicial recourse for alleged rights violations
by the state.
71. GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTrrUTION] art. 20, para. 3. (This and subsequent
translations are those of the author unless otherwise indicated.)
72- Id. art. 20, para. 3. The Basic Rights are a list of enumerated rights
guaranteed by the Grundgesetz. They are often called the Grundgesetz's "Bill of
Rights."
2000]
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positive notion of 'justice,' a notion that appears to include unwritten
norms of governance. 7 3  In other words, the Rechtsstaat must
conform its actions to the Grundgesetz's unwritten "objective order of
values," a hierarchy of enduring values which embody the framers'
most basic value choices.'
Human dignity, as discussed in more detail below, represents the
pinnacle value in this hierarchy. Other basic values existing apart
from the constitution's text include concepts such as "justice"'75 and
the institutional choice of a "free democratic basic order."76 Also, the
Basic Rights guaranteed in the Grundgesetz are considered supra-
positive values themselves, and as a value, each Basic Right "imposes
an obligation on the state to insure that it becomes an integral part of
the general legal order."77  However, the Rechtsstaat may have an
obligation to limit certain Basic Rights in furtherance of higher values
within the constitutional order.
73. See Kommers, supra note 5, at 846; see also GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION]
art. 20, para. 3. Article 20, paragraph 3, is regarded as establishing the modem
Rechtsstaat, subjects legislation to the constitutional order, and binds the executive
and the judiciary to both law and justice. As understood by the FCC, article 20
requires that laws "conform to unwritten fundamental principles as well as to the
fundamental decisions of the Grundgesetz." BVerfGE 6, 32 (41), translated in
Kommers, supra note 5, at 846. Thus, the Rechtsstaat is now a tool of the
constitutional state; it is a means of effectuating those values inherent in the
constitutional order.
74. Kommers, supra note 5, at 858-59 ("These basic values are objective because
they are said to have an independent reality under the Constitution, imposing upon
all organs of government an affirmative duty to see that they are realized in
practice.").
75. GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION] art. 20, para. 3. "Justice" ("Recht") is
differentiated from mere statutory law ("Gesetz").
76. The importance of the "free democratic basic order" becomes apparent when
one realizes that human dignity cannot be the pinnacle value in a totalitarian
government. These values are considered so fundamental to the constitutional order
that the Grundgesetz declares political enemies to this system of government
unconstitutional. Id. art. 21, para. 2.
77. Kommers, supra note 5, at 859. Professor Kommers illustrates this idea with
the following example:
The right to freedom of the press protects a newspaper against any action of
the state that would encroach upon its independence, but as an objective
value applicable to society as a whole the state is duty-bound to create the
conditions that make freedom of the press both possible and effective. In
practice, this means that the state may have to regulate the press to promote
the value of democracy; for example, by enacting legislation to prevent the
press from becoming the captive of any dominant group or interest.
Id.
78. See id. at 860 ("In the event.., of a conflict between a subjective right and an
[Vol. 23:173
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B. Article 1: Human Dignity
In response to the inhumanity of the Third Reich, the framers of
the Grundgesetz explicitly sought to create a "bulwark[] against
totalitarianism."'79 With this end in mind, the Grundgesetz guarantees
that "[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable."'  This notion of human
dignity represents the pinnacle value in the constitutional order-it is
both "the starting and middle point of [Germany's] constitutional
culture."81 Drawing on deep-rooted German traditions, the Federal
Constitutional Court' defines human dignity as "the principle that
'each person must always be an end in himself."' "n Thus, in contrast
to the Nazi era, the people no longer exist to serve the state, but
rather, the state exists to serve the people. 4 The Grundgesetz reveres
objective value, the latter is often likely to trump the former."). This concept
becomes especially important in the Lauschangriff debate. Proponents of the
Lauschangriff claim that the Rechtsstaat principle requires the state to limit the right
guaranteed under article 13 in order to further other values such as human dignity
(i.e., protecting society from injury caused by crime), or democracy (i.e., preventing
the corruption of the democratic institution by organized crime). Opponents argue
that article 13 serves to effectuate human dignity, the highest constitutional value.
Thus, the argument goes, the Rechtsstaat principle requires the state to act in such a
manner as promotes this value.
79. INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN
INDUSTRIAL NATIONS 5 (Keith G. Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 1985).
80. GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTI-uTION] art. 1, para. 1. The framers of the
Grundgesetz were well aware that human dignity "had been utterly trampled by the
Nazis." CURRIE, supra note 65, at 11.
81. Reinhold Zippelius, Artikel 1, in KOMMENTAR ZUM BONNER GRUNDGESETZ 7
(1989) (author's translation). The FCC has described this value as the "center of all
[constitutional] determinations." BVerfGE 39, 1 (67).
82. The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) is a separate
and distinct tribunal, which decides only constitutional disputes. See Kommers, supra
note 5, at 840-45.
83. BVerfGE 45, 187 (228) (1977). The concept of "human dignity" has its roots
in Christianity, social democratic theory, and Kantian thought. See KOMMERS, supra
note 64, at 304. Here, the court relies heavily on Kant's theory of moral autonomy.
See id. at 301. According to Kant, human dignity is grounded in self-determination-
each individual must follow the commands of his own conscience. Kant recognized
as a primary derivative principle of moral autonomy that each person must be
respected for his capacity to make moral choices; thus, the value of human dignity
demands that each person must therefore be respected as an ends in and of himself or
herself. See Zippelius, supra note 81, at 9. In this respect, the framers' emphasis on
human dignity as the pinnacle value becomes more understandable. Under the Third
Reich, people were treated as mere objects, or tools, used to achieve the ultimate
fascist goals. The Nazis desecrated human dignity by engaging in defamation,
discrimination, deprivation of rights, forced labor, slavery, terror and mass murder to
achieve these fascist goals. See &L at 11.
84. The guarantee of human dignity is a clear repudiation of the Nazi slogan "Du
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human dignity as such an essential feature of human existence that it
imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to create conditions
necessary for its realization.' Furthermore, as the ultimate
constitutional value, human dignity is protected for all eternity from
alteration or abrogation by amendment.'
Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Grundgesetz establishes that
human dignity is the foundation of all human rights.' However, it is
doubtful whether human dignity could stand on its own as an
enforceable right.' Instead, human dignity as an enforceable value
manifests itself through the remaining Basic Rights.Y Thus, the
remaining Basic Rights can be viewed as vehicles for the realization
of the value of human dignity.' To the extent that this is so, each of
bist nichts, dein Volk ist alles." ["You are nothing, your people [i.e., the state] is
everything."]. Id. at 7 (author's translation).
85. Article 1, paragraph 1, declares that "[t]o respect and protect [human dignity]
is the duty of all state authority." GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION] art. 1, para. 1.
The FCC has "characterized human dignity as an objective and subjective right:
objective in the sense of imposing an affirmative obligation on the state to establish
conditions necessary for the realization of dignity; subjective in the sense of barring
the state from any direct interference with the negative freedom of individuals."
KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 312.
86. Article 79, paragraph 3, reads, "Amendments to this Grundgesetz affecting
the division of the Federation into Uinder, their participation in the legislative
process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be prohibited."
GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION] art. 79, para. 3. This clause is known as the
"Ewigkeitsklausel," or the "Eternity Clause," because it is meant to make the basic
fundamental values of the constitutional order invulnerable to attack.
87. Article 1, paragraph 2, declares that "[t]he German people therefore
acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every
community, of peace, and of justice in the world." GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION]
art. 1, para. 2 (emphasis added). The use of the word "therefore" has been
interpreted to support the conclusion that human rights, which are ultimately
expressed in the Basic Rights, derive from the value of human dignity. See v.
MANGOLDT ET AL., supra note 64, at 68.
88. See id. at 37; see also HANS D. JARASS & BODO PIEROTH, GRUNDGESETZ FOR
DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 38 (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche
Verlagsbuchhandlung 1997).
89. See v. MANGOLDT ET AL., supra note 64, at 81 ("The Basic Rights are
collectively viewed as an expression of the human rights," which are themselves
grounded in the notion of human dignity.) (author's translation). According to
Professor Kommers, "[a]ll of the ensuing rights enumerated in the remaining
eighteen articles of the Bill of Rights are designed to actualize this crowning principle
of human dignity." Kommers, supra note 5, at 855. However, human rights are not
identical with Basic Rights. In some instances, Basic Rights provide greater
protection against the state than do either human rights or human dignity. See v.
MANGOLDT ET AL., supra note 64, at 81-82.
90. See Kommers, supra note 5, at 855 ("All of the ensuing rights in the
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the Basic Rights is protected from alteration or abrogation by the
"Eternity Clause."'" That is, no article may be amended in such a way
that limits the basic guarantee of human dignity.'
Despite being cast in absolute terms, the value of human dignity
is subject to an implicit limitation. This limitation stems from the
German understanding of the Staat (state). According to Kant, the
Staat represents "the perfect synthesis between individual freedom
and the objective authority of law."'93 In Hegel, the Staat is "a moral
organism in which individual liberty finds perfect realization in the
unified will of the people."' This symbiotic understanding of man in
unity with society has been adopted by the FCC: "The image of man
in the Grundgesetz is not that of an isolated, sovereign individual;
rather, the Grundgesetz has decided in favor of a relationship
between individual and community in the sense of a person's
dependence on and commitment to the community, without
infringing upon a person's individual value."" In other words, the
individual enjoys freedom within the Staat, but only "'on condition of
his recognizing, believing in, and willing that which is common to the
whole."'"6 Thus, with respect to the individual, human dignity is not
only a personal value, but also a societal value. As understood by the
framers of the Grundgesetz, "any realization of human dignity implies
remaining 18 articles of the Bill of Rights are designed to actualize the crowning
principle of human dignity set forth in Article 1."1); KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 313
(stating that human dignity can be viewed as "a shorthand expression of other
guaranteed rights"). However, this does not mean that human dignity is synonymous
with the content of the remaining Basic Rights. Many Basic Rights provide
protection above and beyond that offered to an individual's human dignity. See v.
MANGOLDT ET AL., supra note 64, at 68. But to the extent that those rights serve to
promote the value of human dignity, the Eternity Clause protects them from
amendment.
91. GRUNDGESETZ [CONsTrrUTIoN] art. 79, para. 3.
92. See v. MANGOLDT ET AL., supra note 64, at 73 n.22 ("Basic Rights may only
be constitutionally amended as long as neither human dignity, nor the human rights,
nor the directly binding power of the Basic Rights, becomes injured.") (author's
translation) (citing W. Ziedler, DVB1. 1950, 598ff).
93. KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 33.
94. Id.
95. The Investment Aid Case, BVerfGE 4,7 (15ff) (1954), translated in KOMMERS,
supra note 64, at 305. More recently, the FCC reaffirmed this principle in The Klass
Case, BVerfGE 30,1 (20) (1970).
96. KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 33 (quoting GEORG FRIEDRICH WILHELM
HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 19, (J. Sibree trans., Willey Book Company
1944)). The Grundgesetz "sees no necessary antagonism between individual rights
and communitarian values." Kommers, supra note 5, at 873.
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a fusion of individual rights and social responsibilities."'  This
understanding pervades all aspects of German law and is thus
applicable to the exercise of each of the Basic Rights as well.
C. The Free Development of Personality
The Grundgesetz's primary vehicle for the realization of human
dignity appears in article 2, which guarantees the right to the free
development of personality." This right to personality is loosely
analogous to substantive due process in U.S. law.9 At first glance, it
seems to connote a general right to privacy." However, the FCC has
refused to give the right to personality such a restrictive
interpretation. In an early case, the FCC stated that the free
development of personality embraces a general right to freedom of
action ("eine allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit") 1' This broad
construction had the effect of expanding article 2's application, in
much the same way that Allgeyer v. Louisiana" expanded the notion
of liberty in American constitutional jurisprudence.1" After the
FCC's pronouncement, citizens were free to seek judicial redress
under article 2 for any restrictive governmental action."0 This broad
97. Kommers, supra note 5, at 856 (citing K. STERN, DAS STAATSRECHT DES [sic]
REPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 877-937 (2d ed. 1984).
98. According to the FCC, "the preeminent importance of the right to the free
development and respect of personality... follows from its close connection with the
supreme value enshrined in the Constitution, i.e., human dignity." BVerfGE 35, 202
(221) (1973), excerpts translated in KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 575 n.24. In another
case, the court asserted that "the intrinsic dignity of each person depends on his
status as an independent personality." BVerfGE 45, 187 (1977), excerpts translated in
KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 308.
99. See CURRIE, supra note 65, at 316-17.
100. See id.
101. BVerfGE 6, 32 (36ff) (1957).
102. 165 U.S. 578 (1987).
103. See CURRIE, supra note 65, at 317. In Allgeyer, Justice Peckham declared,
"The liberty mentioned in [the Due Process Clause] means not only the right of the
citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration,
but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment
of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he
will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or
avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes
mentioned above." Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589.
104. CURRIE, supra note 65, at 317. According to one commentator, the FCC's
pronouncement meant that "[e]very burden imposed on the citizen [had] become the
invasion of a fundamental right." KLAUS SCHLAICH, DAS
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 107 (1985), translated in CURRIE, supra note 65, at
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application of article 2 and its close relation to the core value of
human dignity have made the right to free development of
personality a staple claim in most constitutional complaints alleging
intrusive state action.
Recognizing the excessively broad reach of article 2, the FCC has
confined its application through several limitations imposed upon it.1°"
First, the right to personality is generally "subordinate to those
positive rights of liberty expressly mentioned in the Grundgesetz."'
This means that intrusive state activity must be measured against the
more particularized Basic Rights before resort to article 2 will be
allowed." Those other Basic Rights are often subject to express
limitations not applicable to the right to personality. Intrusive state
action must be measured according to these more particularized
limitations on the Basic Rights."'s
Second, the right to personality is only enforceable against the
state with respect to intrusive state activity."° Unlike the principle of
human dignity, the right to personality is not a positive right against
the state." Therefore, the right to personality does not "impose on
the state an affirmative obligation to take some particular course of
action." '' In other words, the state has no obligation to create the
conditions necessary for the free development of personality.
The final limitation on the right to personality appears in the
Grundgesetz itself. Immediately after granting the right to free
development of personality, the Grundgesetz qualifies this right by
guaranteeing it "only insofar as [the individual claiming the right]
does not violate the rights of others or offend against the
constitutional order or the moral code.' 1 . With respect to state
activity, this generally means that any statute limiting human
behavior is lawful as long as it is in harmony with the moral code or
the constitutional order. 3
317. Professor Kommers notes that "[t]he personality right is so broad in its phrasing
that almost any content could be poured into it." KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 313.
105. See KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 313.
106. Id.
107. See v. MANGOLDT ET AL., supra note 64, at 175.
108. See id.
109. See KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 314.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION] art. 2, para. 1.
113. See KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 314.
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D. Limiting the Basic Rights
No right under the Grundgesetz is absolute. The Grundgesetz
limits the exercise of the Basic Rights in a number of ways. First, the
exercise of Basic Rights must conform to the "objective order of
values." '114 Where an overriding objective value conflicts with the
exercise of a subjective right, the objective value takes precedence."5
In other words, "[a]ll rights, including those cast in more absolute
terms, are limited by the architectonic political principle that informs
the Grundgesetz as a whole, namely, the 'free democratic basic
order."
,116
The Grundgesetz also establishes an explicit hierarchy of rights
and limitations."7 Certain rights are expressly limited by the
Grundgesetz itself."8 Other rights, called conditional rights, may be
limited by law (Gesetz). Where a Basic Right may be limited by law,
only a special legislative enactment may effectuate such a limitation."9
Still other rights may be restricted by general laws. That is, no
specific legislation is required to restrict the applicable right. Instead,
these rights are limited by provisions of the general laws, such as
general enactments under the criminal or civil code."
E. Schrankenschranken: Limits on the State's Power to Limit the
Basic Rights.
Although the Grundgesetz expressly allows the state to curtail
certain Basic Rights, it also constrains the state from abusing this
power in a number of ways. First, the Eternity Clause prohibits the
state from passing any laws that limit the value of human dignity as
expressed through the Basic Rights.' Second, article 19 prohibits the
state from acting in any manner that encroaches upon the essence of
114. See discussion of this concept supra Part III.A.
115. See supra text accompanying note 77.
116. Kommers, supra note 5, at 857.
117. See id.
118. According to Professor Kommers, "[tihese rights, like those framed in
unconditional terms, are the object of the [Federal] Constitutional Court's special
vigilance. The state has the burden of showing that any limitation upon such rights
falls within the explicit exceptions mentioned in the Constitution." Id.
119. See id. at 857-58. Note that the right to personality, as described above, is
considered a conditional right and is therefore subject to limitation by statute.
120. See id. at 858.
121. See supra note 86.
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any Basic Right." Although this principle, known as the
Wesensgehaltsgarantie ("essential content guarantee"), is remarkably
similar to the Eternity Clause, it actually acts as an additional
constraint on state action. Whereas the Eternity Clause protects the
core value of "human dignity," as embodied in the Basic Rights, the
essential content protected by the Wesensgehaltsgarantie may extend
a greater or lesser degree of protection."n That is, the essential
content of any given Basic Right is not necessarily identical to the
value of human dignity expressed through that Right.24 Exactly what
constitutes the "essential content" of any given Basic Right is
generally quite controversial. Finally, and most importantly, the state
is constrained by the principle of proportionality
(Verhiiltnismi43igkeit).2' As developed by the FCC, the
proportionality principle requires application of a three-step test to
ensure that a state action that interferes with a Basic Right conforms
to the objective order of values.126 Professors Hailbronner and
Hummel describe this three-step test as follows:
The proportionality principle requires any interference with
fundamental rights to be appropriate, necessary, and reasonable,
i.e., proportional in the narrow sense. An interference is
appropriate if it promotes the objective in any way; it does not have
to be the best means of doing so. Necessary means that there is no
way of achieving this objective that would be less injurious to the
rights of the citizen. In principle, the least invasive means must
always be chosen. Reasonableness means that the interference
must be commensurate with the object sought to be achieved-a
means-purpose relationship test.w
122. GRUNDGESETZ [CONsTrrUTIoN] art. 19, para. 2.
123. See v. MANGOLDT ET AL., supra note 64, at 68.
124. Thus, if legislation impinges upon the value of human dignity with respect to
a certain Basic Right, this does not necessarily justify invocation of the
Wesensgehaltsgarantie.
125. Just as the United States Supreme Court has derived the "rational basis" and
"istrict scrutiny" standards of review from substantive due process, the FCC derives
the proportionality principle from the Rechtsstaat principle as a means of ensuring
that government action restricting the Basic Rights conforms to the values and
principles of the Grundgesetz. See CURRIE, supra note 65, at 20; KOMMERS, supra
note 64, at 46. Although the proportionality principle does not appear anywhere in
the text of the Grundgesetz, the FCC considers it a necessary component of the
Rechtsstaat principle. See CURRIE, supra note 65, at 20.
126. See KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 46.
127. Kay Hailbronner & Hans-Peter Hummel, Constitutional Law, INTRODUCTION
TO GERMAN LAW 68 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996).
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If state action infringing a protected right does not rise to this
standard, it is unconstitutional. The proportionality principle applies
to all state action, even when such state action is explicitly authorized
by the Grundgesetz"
The Lauschangriff legislation will have to withstand analysis
under these three safeguards provided by the Grundgesetz if it is to be
found constitutional. To date, the FCC has not decided any cases
involving the Lauschangriff.
IV. PRIVACY IN THE HOME AS A BASIC RIGHT
Reflecting centuries of European legal tradition, 9 the
Grundgesetz recognizes the home as "the middle point of human
existence."'30  It is considered the place where the individual
development of personality occurs. 3' Because the home is so vital to
the rights of human dignity and personality, article 13 of the
Grundgesetz guarantees to each individual an elemental living area."
That is, it guarantees a place of refuge, where each person has a right
"to be left alone.""' This right is embodied in article 13 of the
Grundgesetz.
Section A of this Part discusses article 13 as originally enacted.
An introduction to the mechanics of article 13 is necessary to explain
the Grundgesetz's prohibition on the use of electronic surveillance to
128. See CURRIE, supra note 65, at 309-10.
129. The special, intimate function served by the home was first legally recognized
in antiquity. Greek and Roman law accorded the home special protection as the
living area of the family, and as a place of worship and refuge. See Matthias
Herdegen, Artikel 13, in KOMMENTAR ZUM BONNER GRUNDGESETZ 8 (1993).
Common law expressions such as "My house is my castle" reflect the enduring
prominence of the home in the development of Western law. See id. The right to
privacy in the home was first recognized as a fundamental right in the Virginia Bill of
Rights from 1770, and it is embodied in the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See Herdegen at 9. In Germany, the inviolability of the home was first
recognized as a fundamental right in the Paulskirchen Constitution of 1849. See
Herdegen at 9-10. The Weimar Constitution also guaranteed the privacy of the
home, but, as explained above, it offered no means of enforcing that right. See
Herdegen at 10.
130. BVerfGE 18, 121 (131ff).
131. See BVerfGE 32, 54 (70,72).
132. See Herdegen, supra note 129, at 7.
133. BVerfGE 32, 54 (75). As will be discussed, opponents of the Lauschangriff
claim that this refuge of privacy, which serves such an important function in each
person's individual development, is destroyed when the state is allowed to monitor
activities occurring within the home.
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monitor private homes. Section B will then lay out the changes
effected by the recent constitutional amendment to article 13.
A. Article 13 as Originally Enacted
Article 13 guarantees that "[t]he home is inviolable."'' This
guarantee generally prohibits the state from entering the "home"
without legal justification or authorization, or to remain in the
"home" against the will of the occupants. 35 The FCC reads the term
"home" expansively, but refuses to release the term from its spatial
definition.136 As construed by the court, every room which is private,
which is not generally accessible to the public, and which serves as an
abode or residence may serve as a "home" for purposes of article
13.' 7 Reflecting the close relation between the home and the
development of personality, the decisive question is whether the area
for which protection is claimed has been or is being used as a "refuge
area for individual development.""' Thus, the term "home," within
the meaning of article 13, has been held to include fenced-in play
areas, gardens, hotel rooms, tents, sleeping cars, etc."' Furthermore,
even rooms used for business can be "homes," because "occupational
freedom [is] an essential part of the development of personality."'"
A brief comparison with American Fourth Amendment
134. GRUNDGESETZ [CONsTrruTIoN] art. 13, para. 1.
135. BVerfGE 65, 1 (40). Like other Basic Rights, the right guaranteed under
article 13 is also a value within the objective order of values. As such, the right to
privacy in the home requires that all laws, whether criminal or civil, respect that
value. See Herdegen, supra note 129, at 11-12. For example, the law of obligations
may not give effect to a provision in a lease which grants the landlord an unlimited
right of entry because the value of the home to the development of personality
outweighs the value embodied in the right to contract. See id. at 13. Note, however,
that article 13 is only a negative right-it may be invoked to keep the state at bay, but
it does not impose an affirmative obligation on the state to provide housing. See id.
at 12-13.
136. See Andreas Ransiek, Strafrrozessuale Abhrmafinahmen und
verfassungsrechtlicher Schutz der Wohnung-ein rechtsvergleichender Blick, in
GOLDAMMERS ARCHIV FOR STRAFRECHT 24-25 (Paul-GUnter P6tz ed., R.v. Decker's
Verlag 1995).
137. Herdegen, supra note 129, at 19.
138. Id. at 20.
139. See id.
140. BVerfGE 32, 54 (71). However, they are only considered "homes" to the
extent that they are not open to the public, and to the extent that private life unfolds
in them. See id. at 76-78. The intensity of protection accorded to business areas is
also diminished because authorities may enter business premises to conduct
regulatory inspections. See Herdegen, supra note 129, at 22-23.
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jurisprudence will help clarify the scope of protection afforded by
article 13. In Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Amendment's protection of "persons, houses, papers, and
effects" extended to telephone conversations in a public telephone
booth, even though such protection would not ordinarily flow from
the plain language of the text. 4' In this sense, this expansive reading
of the Fourth Amendment parallels the approach taken by the FCC.
In another sense, however, the U.S. Supreme Court went one step
further than the FCC-it completely detached the constitutional
protection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment from any literal
reading of the text. Rejecting the argument that a telephone booth
does not fall within the ambit of "persons, houses, papers, and
effects," the Court explained that a search occurs within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment whenever the state infringes upon a
person's "reasonable expectation of privacy."'42 Thus, whereas article
13 can still be said to protect only the "home" in a spatial sense, the
Fourth Amendment does not protect merely "persons, houses,
papers, and effects. ' ',4 3  Instead, the Fourth Amendment looks
exclusively to the individual's interest in privacy. As the Court
explained, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."'"
Although cast in absolute terms, the right granted by article 13
may be limited by the state. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the pre-
amendment version of article 13 set forth a regulatory scheme
prescribing the necessary conditions and limitations on all state action
which limits the "inviolability of the home."'' 5 With respect to the
Lauschangriff, it is best to think of these provisions as addressing two
distinct activities. Paragraph 2 deals with state action aimed at
gathering evidence for the prosecution of crime. Conversely,
141. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351(1967).
142. Id.
143. See Ransiek, supra note 136, at 24-25. For example, automobiles are not
protected at all under article 13 unless they are used (both objectively and
subjectively) as a residence, in which case they receive article 13's full protection. See
Herdegen, supra note 129, at 20-21. In contrast, the Fourth Amendment extends
protection to all automobiles to the extent that the person invoking the right has a
reasonable expectation of privacy therein. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969) (limiting the extent of permissible searches of automobiles incident to an
arrest). Because of this distinction, a telephone booth would never receive
protection under article 13.
144. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
145. The appendix to this article contains a translation of both the full text of
article 13 as originally enacted and the full text of article 13 as recently amended.
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paragraph 3 addresses state action aimed at the prevention of
imminent harm or danger.146 Any state action that infringes the right
guaranteed by article 13, but does not fall into either of these
categories, is unconstitutional.47
Paragraph 2 regulates "searches," which are considered the most
invasive intrusions the state can make.'" The FCC defines a "search"
as a "state-led, goal-oriented search for persons or things, or for the
investigation of some happening which the inhabitant of the home
wishes to keep private.' '4 9  "Searches" are generally physical
intrusions by the state that are conducted openly in the search for
objects or persons already in existence at the time the intrusion
begins."f Thus, from an evidentiary standpoint, it is entirely
backward-looking.'' As discussed above, evidence obtained as a
result of a lawful "search" may be used for prosecutorial purposes.'52
As understood in the German constitutional framework, this
narrow definition of the term "search" does not embrace electronic
surveillance for several reasons." First, a "search" is considered a
146. This distinction between prosecution and prevention is at the heart of the
Lauschangriff controversy and was the impetus for the amendment to article 13. See
Stichwort: "grofier Lauschangriff," ANWALTSBLATrGESPRACH, Apr. 1998, 185, 187
(interview with Horst Eylmann, chairman of the law committee of the Bundestag,
and Eberhard Kempf, chairman of the criminal law committee of the German
Lawyers' Association).
147. See id.
148. See Herdegen, supra note 129, at 30. Paragraph 2 reads: "[s]earches may be
ordered only by a judge or, in the event of danger resulting in any delay in taking
action, by other organs as provided by statute and may be carried out only in the
form prescribed by law." GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTrrUION] art. 13, para. 2, translated
in CURRIE, supra note 65, at 348. Professor Currie adapted the English version of the
Grundgesetz from an official publication of the Press and Information Office of the
German Federal Government. See id. at xiv.
149. BVerfGE 51, 97 (106).
150. See Herdegen, supra note 129, at 32-33. Compare the U.S. Supreme Court's
treatment of the term "search" in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Katz, the
Court gave the term "search" an extraordinarily broad definition: a search occurs
whenever the state intrudes upon a "reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz, 389
U.S. at 351. The result of the FCC's narrow construction of the term "search" is that
many state activities will fall outside the strict regulatory scheme of article 13.
151. See Stichwort: "grofier Lauschangriff," supra note 146, at 187.
152. According to the FCC, lawfully obtained information may only be used for
the purpose prescribed by the law that authorized the underlying search. See
BVerfGE 65,1 (46).
153. See James G. Carr, Wiretapping in West Germany, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 607,
610 (1981).
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public exercise of state power requiring some form of notice."5
Electronic surveillance, by its very nature, requires the utmost
secrecy. If a suspect realizes that the police are monitoring him, he
will certainly refrain from making any incriminating statements.'
Thus, requiring the police to give notice would frustrate the
objectives of the search.156 Second, a "search" within the meaning of
article 13 generally entails a search for physical evidence." 7
Conversely, electronic surveillance entails a search for information
not yet in existence. This distinction makes application of a single
regulatory scheme to both types of "searches" impractical. For
example, "future conversations are intangible and their precise
content can never be known or specified in a wiretapping order."'58
Finally, the number of persons affected by electronic surveillance "is
far greater than the number affected by a search for tangible items."'59
Because conversations necessarily involve more than one party, it is
impossible to restrict the scope of electronic surveillance to the words
of the suspect alone. From the German standpoint, therefore,
extending the scope of the term "search" to include electronic
surveillance would be "incomprehensible."'60  Because electronic
surveillance does not constitute a "search," the state may not use
electronic surveillance to monitor private homes for prosecutorial
purposes.
Former paragraph 3 regulates cases where the state enters the
home in order to prevent imminent danger. It is a catch-all provision
applicable to all "encroachments and restrictions" that do not qualify
as "searches.' 61 Paragraph 3 permits the state to intrude into a home
only in the most serious situations. It states that "[e]ncroachments
and restrictions may otherwise be made only to avert a public danger
or a mortal danger to individuals, or, pursuant to statute, to prevent
154. See Herdegen, supra note 129, at 32-33.
155. See The Klass Case, BVerfGE 30,1 (26ff).
156. See id. See also Carr, supra note 153, at 610.
157. See Herdegen, supra note 129, at 32-33.
158. Carr, supra note 153, at 610.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. JuRAss & PIEROTH, supra note 88, at 325. For example, if a police officer
lawfully enters a home for purposes other than to search, the fact that he accidentally
uncovers evidence of the commission of a crime does not alter the nature of the
intrusion. To fall under the regulation of article 13, paragraph 2, the state's intrusion
must be a goal-oriented "search".
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pressing danger to public security and order."' 6 This regulation of
encroachments is distinguishable from the regulation of searches in
two important respects. First, encroachments require exigent
circumstances in order to be legally justifiable. This requirement of
exigency reflects the forward-looking nature of this paragraph-in
contrast to "searches," encroachments are allowable solely as a
preventive measure.16 Second, because encroachments are only
justifiable in the most urgent situations, prior judicial authorization is
not required.' As discussed below, much of the controversy
surrounding the Lauschangriff concerned whether electronic
surveillance constituted an encroachment at all. To the extent that
electronic surveillance does constitute an encroachment, it may only
be lawfully employed under the narrow circumstances described in
paragraph 3.
The Lauschangriff legislation encompasses two distinct methods
of electronic surveillance to monitor private homes, which vary in
their degree of intrusion into the home. The first technique, called
"der kleine Lauschangriff,"6 ' is relatively uncontroversial. It entails
the use of police agents to surreptitiously enter a home in order to
install a "bug."'6 This method clearly constitutes an "encroachment"
of the right guaranteed by article 13 because it requires the police to
physically enter the home. As an encroachment, der kleine
Lauschangriff is a lawful exercise of state authority only if the police
are primarily seeking to prevent imminent danger.' 67 However, in the
162. GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION] art. 13, para. 3 (emphasis added). This
article also lists particular situations that would justify encroachment by the state.
These situations include relieving housing shortages, combatting epidemics, and
protecting endangered children. See id. This article was amended on February 8,
1998. As amended, paragraph 3 is now paragraph 7. The appendix to this article
contains the full text of both versions of article 13.
163. See Stichwort" "grofler Lauschangriff," supra note 146, at 187-88. The effect
of this limitation is to prohibit the state from entering a home pursuant to paragraph
3 in order to gather evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. See iL
164. In fact, even if prior judicial authorization were obtained, an encroachment
prohibited by article 13 would nevertheless be unlawful.
165. "The Little Eavesdropping Attack."
166. See Die Zulissigkeit von Abhonnafnahmen in den Ldndern der Europdichen
Union, DRiZ, Apr., 1995, at 155.
167. See GRUNDGESETZ [CoNsTITUTIoN] art. 13, para 3 (as originally enacted).
Note that the police may use evidence obtained from encroachments for
prosecutorial purposes. However, the encroachment must be initiated for the
purpose of preventing imminent harm. See Stichwort: "grofler Lauschangriff," supra
note 146, at 187-88. Thus, under the pre-amendment version of article 13, police
would have had to wait around for imminent danger to arise before gathering
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context of organized crime, police need to use electronic surveillance
to gather evidence of criminal organizations on an on-going basis.'6
Because this purpose does not seek to prevent imminent danger,
paragraph 3 prohibits der kleine Lauschangriff where it is needed
most.
The second technique for electronic surveillance, "der groj3e
Lauschangriff,"'69 is much more controversial. It entails the use of a
remote microphone (Richtmikrofon) which, when pointed at its
target, records sound from distances of up to several hundred
meters. 70  The question arose whether this constitutes an
encroachment at all under article 13. One view claims that there is no
encroachment because there is no physical intrusion into the home by
the state.17' The police merely record sound waves as they emanate
from within the home. This argument concludes that der grofie
Lauschangriff does not violate article 13 because it is neither a search
nor an encroachment.'2 According to the prevailing view, however,
der groj3e Lauschangriff does constitute an encroachment because
article 13 is designed to protect the activities occurring within the
home, regardless of whether a bug is planted in the home or whether
a truck 1000 meters away is picking up the conversation by use of
high-tech microphones. 73 In either case, the injury to the victim is the
same, and a contrary interpretation would put form over substance. 4
Because der gro3e Lauschangriff constitutes an encroachment, it may
evidence of crime.
168. See supra Part II.D (discussion of problems facing law enforcement officers.
In order to effectively combat organized crime, police must infiltrate the inner circles
of the crime groups.
169. "The Big Eavesdropping Attack."
170. See Die Zuldssigkeit von Abhonnaflnahmen in den Ldndern der Europilichen
Union, supra note 166.
171. See Stichwort: "grofler Lauschangriff, supra note 146, at 187-88.
172. See id.
173. See Ransiek, supra note 136, at 25.
174. See id.
The emphasis must be on the protection of the private sphere rather than on
the manner of the intrusion. It makes no difference, whether the
eavesdropping device is employed inside or outside the home, rather the
decisive issue is to what extent activities within a home are affected and
should be monitored. The private sphere is violated, even though not in a
spatial sense, and that is what matters: Whether a bug is placed in the home





only be used for preventive purposes. Once again, its most important
application, namely the prosecution of crime, is deemed unlawful
under the old version of article 13.
The exclusion of electronic surveillance from the definition of a
"search," coupled with the constitutional restrictions on
encroachments, rendered the most needed use of electronic
surveillance unconstitutional. Before the Lauschangriff legislation
was enacted, criminals were able to take advantage of this gap in the
law by conducting their business in private homes, which could not be
monitored.17 The introduction of the Lauschangriff legislation
provided authorities with an investigative apparatus intended to allow
the police to follow the criminals into their new places of business.17 6
B. The Amendment to Article 13
On February 8, 1998, the German parliament amended article 13
of the Grundgesetz to allow the use of electronic surveillance to
monitor private homes. In order to amend the Grundgesetz, the
parliament had to pass "a law expressly modifying or supplementing
its text."" This amending law had to be carried by two-thirds of the
members of the Bundestag and two-thirds of the members of the
Bundesrat.78 The Lauschangriff legislation passed the Bundestag with
a total of 452 votes, just four more than the required minimum.'79 In
the Bundesrat, the Lauschangriff won approval by a margin of a
175. The limitations imposed by article 13 only apply to surveillance of the
"home." Even before the Lauschangriff legislation was passed, the police were free
to record conversations occurring in places other than a "home." Also, article 10 of
the Grundgesetz, which guarantees the inviolability of the post and
telecommunications, was amended by the G-10 law of 1968 to allow the police to
lawfully wiretap telephones, subject to strict procedural requirements and the
proportionality principle. See Gesetz zur Beschrdnkung des Brief-, Post und
Fernmeldegeheimnisses (Gesetz zu Artikel 10 Grundgesetz), G-10 1968 (BGB1. I
S.949) (Aug. 13, 1968). Even telephone conversations originated in private homes
could be tapped, because the actual wiretap occurs at the public phone company and
because article 10 more directly applies to telephone conversations than does article
13. See Carr, supra note 153, at 630-31.
176. See supra Part II.D (discussing problems facing law enforcement agents).
177. Hailbronner & Hummel, supra note 127, at 73.
178. See id. The German parliament consists of two chambers: the Bundestag and
the Bundesrat. The Bundestag acts as primary lawmaker. The Bundesrat represents
the individual Lnder. The Bundestag generally may override the Bundesrat by a
two-thirds majority vote. However, the Bundesrat enjoys an absolute veto in certain
cases, including amendments to the Grundgesetz. See id. at 50.
179. See Bundestag Approves Constitutional Revision to Allow Electronic
Surveillance, WEEK IN GERMANY, Jan. 23,1998
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single vote."8
The amendment to article 13 resulted in the addition of a
complicated 8' regulatory structure governing the use of electronic
surveillance in the home."~ This new structure addresses the
shortcomings of the pre-amendment search/encroachment bifurcation
by creating two separate sets of requirements necessary for the
initiation of electronic surveillance: one set for prosecutorial
purposes, and another set for preventive purposes. The set of
requirements pertaining to the use of electronic surveillance for
investigative or prosecutorial purposes is embodied in the new
paragraph 3. Paragraph 4 then sets forth the rules relating to the use
of electronic surveillance for preventive purposes. Paragraph 5 deals
exclusively with the use of electronic surveillance to protect
undercover police agents (V-Miinner)1 Finally, paragraph 6 requires
the federal government to report annually to the Bundestag on the
use of electronic surveillance in the home." The following discussion
will highlight the relevant provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4, which
represent the core Lauschangriffinnovations."
Paragraph 3 deals most directly with the problem of investigating
and prosecuting organized criminals. It sets forth the requirements
the state must meet in order to use electronic surveillance to monitor
private homes for prosecutorial purposes."6 The first requirement
limits the use of electronic surveillance to situations where "certain
180. See Germany Reduces Privacy Rights, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, at A8.
181. The amendment to article 13 has been criticized because it resembles in its
complexity a tax or administrative provision more than a Basic Right. However, this
complexity can also be viewed as the result of compromise deriving from a properly
functioning democracy. See Stichwort: "grojler Lauschangriff," supra note 146, at 87.
182. See infra Appendix. Paragraphs 1 and 2 remain unchanged. The old
paragraph 3 is now paragraph 7. The new paragraphs 3 through 6 represent the
entire amendment to article 13.
183. Article 13, paragraph 5 addresses a specialized use of electronic surveillance
that is beyond the scope of this article.
184. The annual report to the Bundestag is modeled after the American example
under Title III. The annual report is intended to be a "passive means of securing
Basic Rights." Jrg-Detlef Kilhne, Artikel 13 (Unverletzlichkeit der Wohnung), in
GRUNDGESETZ 575, 587 (Michael Sachs ed., 1998).
185. Unfortunately, because the FCC has not yet decided a case concerning the
Lauschangriff legislation, it is difficult to predict how the provisions of the new article
13 will be interpreted in practice.
186. GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION] art. 13, para. 3 (specifically allowing police to




facts warrant [reasonable] suspicion" that someone has committed an
especially grievous crime specifically named by statute.""' To meet
this requirement of "reasonable suspicion" (begriindeter Tatverdacht)
the police must demonstrate that there is a reasonable possibility that
the suspect is guilty of the commission of a crime."l This same
standard applies to conventional searches and seizures."g However,
critics have noted that the police should be held to the higher
standard of "adequate suspicion" (hinreichender Tatverdacht)
because of the extreme violation of privacy posed by surreptitious
surveillance.' The standard of "adequate suspicion" is satisfied
when the police reasonably believe the suspect could probably be
convicted of the commission of a crime." Commentators have noted
that the police should be held to this higher standard because the
rules of criminal procedure already require such a showing prior to
the initiation of secret investigations in other contexts. "9 However,
as enacted, the police must only satisfy the reasonable suspicion
standard to justify electronic surveillance of private homes.
187. The original text reads, "Begriinden bestimmte Tatsachen den Verdacht."
188. GRUNDGESETZ [CoNsTrrTIoN] art. 13, para. 3 (as translated). The statute
effectuating the amendment to article 13 lists the crimes for which use of electronic
surveillance is permissible. These include counterfeiting money; trade in human
beings; murder or genocide; crimes against personal freedom; burglary or robbery;
blackmail; dealing in stolen goods; crimes in violation of certain weapons laws; drug
law violations; treason or endangerment of the democratic Rechtsstaat; or any crime
in violation of section 129 of the penal code. Gesetz zur Verbesserung der
Bekminpfung der Organisierten Kriminalitdt, v. 4.5.1998 (BGB1. I S.845). Section 129
of the penal code makes it a crime to be a member of an organized crime group.
Thus, even if one does not commit any crime oneself, one may have committed a
crime by mere association.
189. 3 MONCHENER RECHTSLEXIKON 566 (Horst Tilch ed., 1987). In practice, this
standard falls somewhere between the "reasonable suspicion" standard and the
"probable cause" standard applicable under American Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Interview with Dr. Dieter Umbach, Professor of Law at the
University of Potsdam, Germany (Feb. 17, 1999).
190. See id.
191. See, e.g., Kiine, supra note 184, at 586.
192. 3 MONCHENER RECHTSLEXIKON, supra note 189, at 566. In order to make an
arrest, the police generally have to demonstrate adequate suspicion. "Urgent
suspicion" (Dringender Tatverdacht), which represents the highest standard, is
generally required whenever the state deprives an individual of freedom. !L The
Lauschangriff does not require the police to demonstrate either adequate or urgent
suspicion, because, at the point when those standards are met, electronic surveillance
is already unnecessary for prosecution and arrest. See Kihne, supra note 184, at 586.
193. See, e.g., Ktihne, supra note 184, at 586; see also § 100a, para. 1
Strafprozegordnung.
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An even more disturbing aspect related to the standard imposed
on the state concerns the degree of suspicion necessary to enter the
homes of third parties. Once the police establish reasonable
suspicion that an individual has committed a crime, electronic
surveillance may be deployed over any "dwelling[] where the suspect
is believed to be staying." '194 This provision is especially troubling
because it subjects the police to a standard of mere belief in
determining which home to monitor. The higher standard of
"reasonable suspicion," described above, applies only to the issue of
whether a particular individual has committed an especially grievous
crime. Once the police have made that determination, mere belief
that the suspect is staying at a friend's house, for example, justifies
electronic surveillance of that house. By contrast, the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires a showing of probable
cause before the police may search a third party's home for a suspect,
even if the police already have an arrest warrant for that suspect.'95 In
this respect, German law utterly fails to respect the Basic Rights of
unsuspected parties.
However, other requirements in paragraph 3 seek to enhance the
degree of protection accorded to the Basic Rights by ensuring that
the state complies with the proportionality principle. As described
above, that principle requires all state action to be appropriate,
reasonable and necessary.'96 In the context of electronic surveillance,
the proportionality principle "can be construed as a prohibition
against [electronic surveillance] which in [its] intensity, scope and
duration exceed[s] constitutionally justifiable limits."'" Paragraph 3
addresses the proportionality principle in a number of ways. First, it
limits the scope of electronic surveillance to include only acoustic
technology."' By limiting the use of electronic surveillance for
prosecutorial purposes to acoustic technology, the legislature
recognized that video surveillance represents an extraordinary
violation of the right to privacy that could not be justified by the mere
need to prosecute crime. Second, paragraph 3 requires electronic
surveillance to be of limited duration." By limiting the permissible
194. GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION] art. 13, para. 3 (as amended 1998) (emphasis
added).
195. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
196. See supra text accompanying note 127.
197. Carr, supra note 153, at 639-40.




duration of the surveillance, paragraph 3 minimizes potential abuses
by the police. The permissible duration is designated by statute,
which presently limits surveillance orders to four weeks.m However,
extensions of up to four weeks may be obtained as long as the facts
that gave rise to the original surveillance order persist.20' Finally,
paragraph 3 enhances prior, independent judicial review of electronic
surveillance applications by requiring judicial authorization from a
panel of three judges, or in the case of imminent danger, from a single
judge.' This requirement is intended to ensure the reasonableness of
the determination that acoustic surveillance is warranted.2'3
Importantly, this requirement allows no room for police discretion.
In every case where the police wish to use electronic surveillance to
gather evidence of crime from a home, the police must obtain
advance judicial authorization.
Paragraph 4 sets forth the conditions underlying the justifiable
use of electronic surveillance for preventive purposes. It allows the
use of "technological means of surveillance over dwellings" in order
to "avert pressing dangers to public security, especially a public or
mortal danger.""" This paragraph deviates from the confinement to
acoustic surveillance imposed by paragraph 3 by allowing the police
to utilize both audio (Lauschangriff) and video surveillance
(Spidhangriff) to avert pressing public danger.0 5  Before such
surveillance begins, the police must obtain a judicial order.26
200. Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Bekiimpfung der Organisierten Kriminalitiit, v.
4.5.1998 (BGBI. I S.847).
201. See id.
202. See GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION] art. 13, para. 3.
203. One must question whether this requirement will really improve the objective
reasonableness of the surveillance orders. Under the G-10 law of 1968, which allows
the police to wiretap telephones, applications for an order are rarely denied. See
Carr, supra note 153, at 623 n.110 ("Interviews with prosecutors... indicat[ed] that
wiretapping applications are rarely if ever rejected by German judges. None of the
interviewees could recall a rejection."). Between 1994 and 1996, orders for telephone
wiretaps doubled from 4,000 to 8,000 "because judges almost never deny
applications." Bernhard Dombek, Der Grote Lauschangriff-Hysterie oder
Abscheu?, in NEUE JUSTIZ, Mar., 1998 (author's translation). Does this merely
increase the number of rubber stamps that police must obtain?
204. GRUNDGESETZ [CoNsTIrrIoN] art. 13, para. 4 (as amended 1998).
205. It is not clear exactly what is meant by "pressing public danger," but this may
encompass the threat of organized crime if the problem it poses continues to escalate
at the current rate. After all, the growth of organized crime was the impetus for the
constitutional amendment.
206. Apparently, "judicial order" under paragraph 4 requires authorization by a
single judge. GRUNDGESTZ [CONSTrrUTION] art. 13, para. 4.
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However, in the case of imminent danger, the determination to
initiate electronic surveillance may be made by "a different,
statutorily determined official," as long as "a subsequent judicial
decision is obtained promptly."' In all cases governed by paragraph
4, the use of electronic surveillance must be the only feasible means
of preventing the harm or danger and the surveillance must be limited
in duration.'
Although both paragraphs 3 and 4 regulate the use of electronic
surveillance in cases of imminent danger, the regulatory schemes
differ depending on whether the purpose is investigative or
preventive. A brief comparison of these schemes will highlight the
distinctions between paragraphs 3 and 4 in general. Paragraph 3
allows evidence derived from electronic surveillance to be used for
prosecutorial purposes, but limits the type of observation to acoustic
surveillance. In order to justify the use of acoustic surveillance, the
police must present ascertainable facts that justify suspicion.
Furthermore, even in the case of imminent danger, a judicial order
must be obtained in advance. Conversely, paragraph 4 permits
electronic surveillance for preventive purposes only, but expands the
permissible manner of observation to include video surveillance.
Also, because surveillance under paragraph 4 may be initiated only
for preventive purposes, a different, statutorily determined official
may authorize surveillance, provided that a subsequent judicial order
is "promptly obtained."2" As this brief comparison demonstrates, if
the police wish to use evidence obtained through electronic
surveillance in a criminal prosecution, they must obtain advance
judicial authorization and limit the surveillance to acoustic devices.
V. Is the Lauschangriff Unconstitutional?
Because German constitutionalism recognizes certain supra-
positive values to which all law must adhere 10 the possibility arises
that a constitutional amendment could actually be unconstitutional."'
Although this possibility appears paradoxical, the FCC has accepted
the "unconstitutional constitutional amendment" as a valid
207. GRUNDGESETZ [CONSTITUTION] art. 13, para. 4 (as amended 1998).
208. See KOHNE, supra note 184, at 587.
209. At the latest, the subsequent judicial authorization must be obtained before
the surveillance measures have been completed. See KOHNE, supra note 184, at 578.
210. See supra Part III.A (discussion of the "objective order of values").
211. KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 48.
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doctrine. According to this doctrine, "even a constitutional
amendment would be unconstitutional were it to conflict with the
core values or spirit of the [Grundgesetz] as a whole." '213 This section
will discuss whether the Lauschangriff conflicts with the right to
personality or the Rechtsstaat principle. If the FCC finds that either
of these principles have in fact been violated, then the Lauschangriff
constitutes an unconstitutional constitutional amendment and should
be struck down.
A. Right to Personality
The strongest argument against the constitutionality of the
amendment to article 13 is that it violates the "essential content"
principle of article 19 by impermissibly restricting the right to
personality guaranteed by article 2. According to the FCC, article 13
guarantees an elemental living space where individual personality can
unfold.214 In other words, article 13 guarantees a place "where [the
individual] can withdraw into himself, a place to which the outside
world has no access, and in which [the individual] is left in peace to
enjoy his right to solitude. 2 5 Thus, the essential content of article 13
can be said to guarantee a refuge for the free development of
personality. The Wesensgehaltsgarantie of article 19 protects this
essential content from alteration or limitation.21 6 The Lauschangriff
violates this essential content by granting the state entry into the most
fundamentally private aspects of one's life. Where can one go now to
escape the presence of the state? Where is that last area of refuge for
the development of personality? Furthermore, the Lauschangriff
abrogates this essential content of article 13 by its mere existence.
Even if electronic surveillance is never deployed, the fear of
surveillance may be enough to alter behavior within the home. As
one commentator has noted, the Lauschangriff "has brought a virus
which will slowly sicken our common existence."2 7 In other words,
212. BVerfGE 3, 225 (234) (1953). It also appeared more recently in The Klass
Case, where the dissenting justices argued that an amendment to article 10 of the
constitution, allowing the police to wiretap telephones, was unconstitutional because
it conflicted with the principles of human dignity and the Rechtsstaat. BVerfGE 30, 1
(33-47) (1970).
213. KOMMERS, supra note 64, at 48.
214. See BVerfGE 42,212 (219).
215. Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, supra note 66, at 88 (author's translation).
216. See supra Part III.E.
217. Dombek, supra note 203.
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the Lauschangriff will ultimately chill the right to personality. 8
Because the Lauschangriff debilitates article 13's essential purpose,
which is to provide an elemental living area for personal
development, the Lauschangriff violates the essential content
guarantee of article 19 and is therefore unconstitutional.
There are two counterarguments to this claim. First, article 13
has always allowed the police to enter the home."9 Even before the
Lauschangriff was enacted, police could enter homes on a basis of
reasonable suspicion to search for evidence of a crime. Thus, the
Lauschangriff does not represent an extension of police power to
enter the homey ° Instead, so the argument goes, the Lauschangriff
merely represents a different method of committing the same
intrusion.' This argument is unpersuasive because it does not
recognize the qualitative difference between a conventional search
and the use of electronic surveillance. Because conventional searches
are conducted openly, individuals can suspend the activities occurring
within the home until the intrusion ceases. Once the intrusion is over,
the individual can feel safe that his privacy has been restored. Thus,
the state is never allowed access to the private unfolding of
personality within the home. Conversely, the very purpose of
electronic surveillance is to give the police a glimpse into the suspect's
private life. Because the surveillance is conducted secretly, the target
has neither the opportunity to shield his private life from the
authorities nor the opportunity to challenge the state action in a court
of law. This distinction renders the Lauschangriff qualitatively
different than conventional searches and intrusions.'
The second counterargument, which is an extension of the first,
claims that the Lauschangriff does not constitute a new type of
intrusion into the home because the police could already use
electronic surveillance to prevent imminent danger under prior law.'
218. Id. In fact, Germany has already become the world leader in per capita
telephone wiretaps. Id.
219. See Stichwort: "grojler Lauschangriff," supra note 146, at 186.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Even though telephone wiretaps represent the same type of intrusion, they
are also qualitatively different from the Lauschangriffi. An individual can avoid the
risk of wiretap by retreating into his home, but to where can the individual who fears
electronic surveillance retreat? See Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, supra note 66, at
88 (arguing that the Lauschangriff is like no other previously allowed invasion of
privacy because there is no chance of retreating to a more secure area).
223. See Stichwort: "groj3er Lauschangriff," supra note 146, at 186.
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However, this argument fails to recognize that the protection of life
from imminent danger represents a greater value than the right to
privacy (or personality) in the objective constitutional order. 4 The
pre-amendment version of article 13 conformed to this objective
order of values by allowing the state to infringe the right to privacy
for the benefit of the greater value of human life. Conversely, the
amendment to article 13 predicates the use of electronic surveillance
on a much lower value, namely the prosecution of crime.' Thus, the
amendment to article 13 indeed represents a new type of intrusion. It
represents one in which the state ignores the objective order of
values.
B. The Rechtsstaat Principle
2 6
A second possible argument against the constitutionality of the
Lauschangriff arises in the context of the Rechtsstaat. As discussed
above, the modern Rechtsstaat has an obligation to ensure that all law
conforms to the objective order of values. 7 Unfortunately, the open-
endedness of this requirement allows the Rechtsstaat to be twisted
into a justification for almost any position. In the debate surrounding
224. See Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, supra note 66, at 88-89.
225. See id.
226. The Lauschangriff will also have to surmount the proportionality principle,
which is an offshoot of the Rechtsstaat principle. As discussed in Part III.E above,
the proportionality principle requires all acts of parliament impinging on a Basic
Right to be appropriate, necessary, and reasonable. At the present time, the
Lauschangriff probably satisfies this standard. The Lauschangriff probably satisfies
the "appropriate" test because electronic surveillance allows police to gather
evidence of organized crime that would otherwise be unattainable. The "necessary"
prong of the proportionality test is probably satisfied because the state has been
unsuccessful at stemming the influx and growth of organized crime in Germany.
Finally, the "reasonable" prong is most likely met. The "reasonableness"
requirement generally means that the burden on the right is not excessive in relation
to the benefits that the state's objective secures. Because the Lauschangriff only
allows the use of electronic surveillance in the investigation of "extremely grievous
crimes," and because the police must reasonably suspect that the target of the
surveillance has committed such a crime, one could conclude that the Lauschangriff
is "reasonable."
Even though the legislation itself is probably proportional to the burden on the
right to privacy, individual uses of electronic surveillance may be disproportional. A
panel of three judges will apply the proportionality principle to each surveillance
application. If the use of electronic surveillance would disproportionately burden the
right to privacy, the panel will deny the application. Thus, the use of electronic
surveillance may not be proportional in an individual case, even though the
amendment itself is proportional in a general sense.
227. See supra Part III.A.
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the Lauschangriff, both proponents and opponents of the legislation
seized upon the Rechtsstaat concept in support of their position." On
the one hand, organized crime threatens the value of human dignity
by subjecting people to pain, torture and even death. Because human
dignity is the pinnacle value in the constitutional order, the
Rechtsstaat has an obligation to create conditions necessary for its
existence.' 9 To create this condition, the Rechtsstaat must therefore
strive to eliminate organized crime in the most efficacious manner,
such as the Lauschangriff. In other words, "the citizens have a right
to protection by the state.""
On the other hand, the value of human dignity is only in danger
when the threat posed by organized crime is imminent."' Prior to the
Lauschangriff, the Grundgesetz allowed the use of electronic
surveillance to prevent the imminent danger posed by organized
crime because the value of life is deemed greater than the value of
privacy in the constitutional order.32 But now the Lauschangriff
allows the police to use electronic surveillance to investigate crimes
that have already occurred. Thus, the same imminent danger to
human dignity does not justify encroachment on the fundamental
right to privacy. 3 Instead, the state poses a threat to human dignity
by making the individual the object of the state action.' Because the
Lauschangriff legislation makes no attempt to exclude from
surveillance the conversations of innocent, or at least unaccused,
parties, those parties are made the unwitting tools of the state in the
investigation of organized crime. Because the Lauschangriff
disrespects the value of human dignity in this manner, the Rechtsstaat
prohibits its use.
The historical development of the modem Rechtsstaat principle
supports this latter view. The modem Rechtsstaat developed as a
revolutionary response to the almost unlimited power of the police
state during the 18th and 19th centuries." Democratic concepts, such
228. See Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, supra note 66, at 89.
229. See BVerfG, NJW 1975, 573. According to the FCC, the state has an
obligation to pass laws protecting the Basic Rights from harm by third persons.
230. Stichwort: "grofier Lauschangriff," supra note 146, at 187 (author's
translation).
231. See Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, supra note 66, at 88-89.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See Denninger, supra note 1, at 402-03
235. See Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, supra note 66, at 89.
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as separation of powers, independence of justice, and government
bound by law, arose to protect personal freedom from this unlimited
state power.2 However, even democracy failed to protect individual
rights during the Weimar Republic. As discussed above, the Nazis
manipulated democracy at the expense of individual rights in order to
achieve their goals. 7  The modern Rechtsstaat prevents such an
occurrence by requiring the state to adhere to supra-positive values.
Although the Rechtsstaat has a duty to protect those values from
harm by third parties, the Rechtsstaat principle itself grew out of a
need to protect the individual from the state. Today, the Rechtsstaat
principle has been twisted to include protecting the individual
through the state..23 Ironically, the Rechtsstaat "protects" the citizens
by robbing them of their right to privacy. Unfortunately, "[w]e know
from experience that the state, when unchained, is and can become
the largest criminal association in existence. ' 9
VI. Effectiveness of the Lauschangriff
Even if the amendment to article 13 proves constitutional, many
doubts remain concerning its potential effectiveness. After seven
years of debate and compromise, two developments may enable
criminals to evade the scope of the Lauschangriff. First, advances in
anti-surveillance technology may render acoustic surveillance
completely impotent. For example, Siemens has repeatedly
developed a special tapestry (Anti-Lausch-Tapete), which prevents
sound from within a home from being recorded by electronic
surveillance outside the home.2' Also, "bug detectors" that detect
whether any eavesdropping devices have been installed on windows
or in walls can be purchased relatively cheaply. 1 Organized criminals
should be expected to obtain such devices either legally or, if such
devices are prohibited, then illegally.
The second factor detracting from the potential effectiveness of
the Lauschangriff is the legislative decision to prohibit the
236. See id.
237. See supra Part III.A.
238. See Stichwort" "grofier Lauschangriff," supra note 146, at 187.
239. Id. at 188. For example, the G-10 law, which allowed police to wiretap
telephones for the first time, has been expanded sixteen times since its enactment in
1968. See Heribert Prantl, Am Anfang war die Todesanzeige, SUEDDEUTSCHE
ZEnTUNG, Mar. 2, 1998.
240. Deutscher Bundestag, DIP, DRUCKSACHE, 13/6653, Dec. 12, 1996.
241. See Stichwort: "grojler Lauschangriff," supra note 146, at 189.
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prosecutorial use of evidence deriving from the electronic
surveillance of persons having a right to refuse testimony
(Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht). The Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht is
similar to the American attorney-client privilege, but it also extends
to numerous other occupations. In order to secure the votes
necessary to pass the Lauschangriff, proponents of the legislation had
to agree that evidence stemming from the electronic surveillance of
persons holding a Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht would be excluded from
trial.2" This legislative compromise stemmed from the fear that the
use of electronic surveillance would undermine the confidentiality
necessary to certain occupations. For example, the police could
otherwise use electronic surveillance to ferret out a newspaper's
confidential sources; record a criminal defendant's conversations with
his attorney; or even eavesdrop on a criminal defendant as he
confesses to his priest. Such potential abuse of the Lauschangriff, it
was argued, would seriously damage those professions requiring
confidentiality; patients, clients and sources might "clam up" out of
fear that the police are eavesdropping. In the end, a total of twenty
occupations were excluded from the scope of the Lauschangriff4 3
Former Minister of the Interior Manfred Kanther noted that this
exclusion dulled a sharp sword that could have been very effective
against organized crime.' Instead, because its breadth is enormous,
it has provided organized crime with an opportunity to structure its
affairs in such a way as to fall outside the scope of permissible
electronic surveillance. 5
242. See Wolfgang Gast, Koalitionsniederlage: Jetzt kommt der kieine groe
Lauschangriff, DIE TAGESZEITUNG, Mar. 6, 1998, at 1.
243. See Markus Franz, Der Grosse Lauschangriff wird urn ein Oehrchen kieiner,
in DIE TAGESZEITUNG, Mar. 6, 1998, at 1. These include doctors, lawyers, journalists,
nurses, pharmacists, legislative delegates, religious leaders, and tax advisors. The
broad scope of this exclusion has caused some commentators to question whether the
Lauschangriff legislation will create a "two-class society." E.g., id.
244. See Eberhard Kempf, Ein letztes Wort gegen den grol3en Lauscheingriff,
ANWALTSBLATI, Dec., 1997, at 651.
245. See Stichwort: "grofier Lauschangriff," supra note 146, at 190-91. Organized
criminals have already taken advantage of confidentiality rules in other areas. For
example, organized crime groups recruit attorneys and bankers, each of whom enjoys
a privilege of confidentiality, to handle money-laundering operations. By doing so,
the organized criminals erect a formidable barrier between themselves and the




Germany is currently struggling to contain the growing threat
posed by organized crime. Because other less invasive measures of
fighting modem criminal sophistication have proved ineffective, the
German legislature has found it necessary to increase police powers
at the expense of individual privacy. In so doing, Germany has
approached, and may have already breached, the limits of
constitutionality. The Federal Constitutional Court will have to
decide whether the use of electronic surveillance deprives the
individual of his guaranteed elemental living area, or whether the
Rechtsstaat principle requires the state to defend democracy at the
expense of personal privacy. However, until the FCC reaches such a
decision, the Lauschangriff will remain in effect.
In the meantime, the Bundestag should take notice of other,
nonconstitutional inadequacies of the Lauschangriff. First, acoustic
surveillance will prove ineffective to fight organized crime in the long
run. Organized criminals will find ways of avoiding electronic
surveillance either by advances in technology or by structuring their
business in such a way as to escape its coverage. As the fight against
organized crime continues, the Bundestag will find it necessary to
expand the scope of the Lauschangriff through ordinary legislation. 6
The second inadequacy of the Lauschangriff lies in its failure to
protect the privacy interests of unsuspected parties. By requiring a
standard of mere reasonable suspicion to justify the use of electronic
surveillance, the Lauschangriff legislation fails to recognize that
electronic surveillance poses an awesome intrusion into the private
sphere. Furthermore, by requiring mere belief that a suspect can be
found in the home of a third party before electronic surveillance may
be implemented, the Lauschangriff utterly fails to protect the
interests of unnamed and possibly innocent parties.
Recognizing that a constitutional amendment addressing these
inadequacies is highly unlikely, and also that the Bundestag will surely
find it necessary to expand the scope of electronic surveillance in the
future, I propose an alteration of the law24 effectuating the
246. The legislature will modify the law authorizing the police to use electronic
surveillance just as it modified the law authorizing the use of wiretaps sixteen times.
Advances in technology and criminal methodology made such modifications
necessary. However, such modifications must always be within the limits imposed by
the Grundgesetz.
247. See supra Part IV.B.
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Lauschangriff in order to better serve both the interests of the state
and the individual."S This strategy entails the implementation of
additional procedures to safeguard basic rights, while recognizing that
the state must and will inevitably expand the scope of permissible
electronic surveillance to enhance the state's ability to fight organized
crime.
First, electronic surveillance should be permissible only on a
showing of adequate suspicion. Because police can already arrest
someone on a showing of adequate suspicion,249 this improvement will
ensure the German people that innocent parties will not be the target
of electronic surveillance. Furthermore, if the state's main objective
in implementing the Lauschangriff is to crack the inner circle of
organized crime,' 0 then this increased showing of suspicion will mean
little more than delaying arrest and prosecution of a known suspect
until after the police have extracted sought-after evidence regarding
unknown suspects through electronic surveillance. Once those core
members have been identified, the police may use other means of
investigation to gather evidence of crime. When police develop
adequate suspicion that the alleged core members have committed
certain crimes, the police could then either arrest those individuals or
use electronic surveillance to bolster the state's case against them.
Second, electronic surveillance of a third-party home should be
permissible only when the police demonstrate adequate suspicion that
the suspect can be located within that home. The current standard of
mere belief allows police to monitor the homes of otherwise
unsuspected individuals based on an officer's unfounded hunches.
Thus, current law provides citizens who are merely associated with
suspected criminals no protection from unreasonable exercises of
police discretion. A standard of adequate suspicion should be
required because such individuals are less likely to be culpable than
the actual named target in the surveillance order. The intense
invasion of privacy inherent in electronic surveillance should be
permissible only when there is strong evidence that a third party has
either committed a crime himself or that the suspect can in fact be
248. The advantage of altering the law which authorizes the police to use
electronic surveillance is that it only requires a simple majority of the Bundestag for
amendment. Another amendment to the Grundgesetz, by contrast, would require
approval from two-thirds of both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The downside is
that any improvements could also be repealed by the same simple majority.
249. See supra text accompanying note 192.
250. See discussion at Part II.D.
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found in the third-party home.
Finally, the use of electronic surveillance should be subject to aminimization requirement similar to that required under the United
State's Title III. Under Title III, an electronic surveillance order
must be executed "in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this
chapter."'" This limitation reflects the excessively broad scope of a
statute that allows seizure of "the conversations of any and all
persons coming into the area covered by the device...
indiscriminately and without regard to their connection to the crime
under investigation." ' 2  Because German law contains no such
limitation, police may monitor all conversations taking place within
the suspect's home. In fact, the police may even record conversations
to which the suspect is not even a party. While a minimization
requirement may be difficult to employ, any effort to limit the
intrusion posed by electronic surveillance is better than the common
German technique of recording all conversations as they occur and
reviewing them at a later date.23
Although these suggested changes will not cure the possible
constitutional deficiencies in the Lauschangriff legislation, they will
serve to protect individual privacy as the state increases the
permissible scope of electronic surveillance. In other words, these
safeguards strike the proper balance between the interest of
protecting the state from organized crime and the interest of
protecting the individual from the state.
251. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(5) (West Supp. 1999).
252. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
253. See Carr, supra note 153, at 625-27.
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Appendix: Article 13 (Inviolability of the Home)
Article 13' (Prior to February 8, 1998)
(1) The home is inviolable.
(2) Searches may be ordered only by a judge or, in the event of
imminent danger, by those other organs designated by statute, and
they may be carried out only in the manner prescribed in such a
statute.
(3) Encroachments and restrictions may otherwise be made only
to avert a public danger or a mortal danger to individuals, or,
pursuant to statute, to prevent pressing danger to public security and
order, in particular to relieve a housing shortage, to combat the
danger of epidemics, or to protect endangered minors.
Article 13b (As Amended February 8, 1998)
(1) The home is inviolable.
(2) Searches may be ordered only by a judge or, in the event of
imminent danger, by those other organs designated by statute, and
they may be carried out only in the manner prescribed in such a
statute.
(3) If certain facts warrant suspicion that someone has committed
an especially grievous crime specifically named by statute, then, to aid
prosecution of the crime, technological means of acoustic surveillance
over dwellings where the suspect is believed to be staying may be
deployed by judicial order if investigation of the facts by other means
would be either disproportionately difficult or futile . The measure
shall be of limited duration. The order shall be entered by a panel of
three judges. In the case of imminent danger it may also be decreed
by a single judge.
(4) Technological means of surveillance over dwellings may be
deployed only by judicial order to avert pressing dangers to public
a. This translation appears in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 348 (1994) (adapted from an official publication of
the Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government).
b. Decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht-Federal Constitutional Court-
Federal Republic of Germany, Vol. 2/PartIl: Freedom of Speech (Freedom of
Opinion and Artistic Expression, Broadcasting Freedom and Communication
Freedom of the Press, Freedom of Assembly), 1958-1995, Published by the Members
of the Court, Karlsruhe 1998, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden.
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security, especially a public or mortal danger. In case of imminent
danger the measure can also be ordered by a different, statutorily
determined official; a subsequent judicial decision must be obtained
promptly.
(5) If the technological means are intended solely to protect
persons acting during a deployment within dwellings, the measure
may be ordered by a statutorily determined official. Use by others of
the knowledge thus obtained is permissible only for the purposes of
prosecuting crime or averting dangers and only if the legality of the
measure is judicially determined beforehand; in case of imminent
danger a subsequent judicial decision must be obtained promptly.
(6) The federal government shall inform the Bundestag annually
regarding deployments of technological means implemented under
paragraph 3, those within the federal sphere of competence under
paragraph 4, and, to the extent that they require judicial review, those
implemented under paragraph 5. A panel elected by the Bundestag
shall exercise parliamentary control on the basis of this report. The
Ldnder shall guarantee an equivalent parliamentary control.
(7) Encroachments and restrictions may otherwise be made only
to avert a public danger or a mortal danger to individuals, or,
pursuant to statute, to prevent pressing danger to public security and
order, in particular to relieve a housing shortage, to combat the
danger of epidemics, or to protect endangered minors.
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